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Article
Zombie forensics: the use
of the polygraph and the
integrity of the criminal
justice system in England
and Wales
Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou
Northumbria University, School of Law, UK
Abstract
The criminal justice system of England and Wales increasingly deploys the polygraph to
extract information from released offenders. Although there is little judicial authority
regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence, we should not misinterpret silence as legal
uncertainty. The paper will, first, show that the central claim for the understanding of the
polygraph—i.e. the presupposition that the polygraph indicates deception—is inextricably
linked to an obsolete paradigm in psychology (Introspection). Secondly, I will turn to first
principles in the law of evidence, especially the general ban on opinion evidence and the
requirement for scientific validity. The requirement that expert evidence has a sufficiently
reliable scientific basis explains why polygraph evidence cannot be adduced at the criminal
process. Thirdly, I will draw attention to the use of polygraph tests in the context of pro-
bation, pursuant to the Offender Management Act 2007. With the use of the polygraph, the
criminal justice system does not only infringe the released offender’s human rights, but also
fails to protect the public. The combination of inadmissibility of the polygraph in the criminal
process and its use from probation services creates thus a major contradiction which is
detrimental to the integrity of the legal order.
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In the long run, the greatest danger of expertism is not conscious fraud or charlatanism but rather a tacit
conspiracy between expert and audience to accept that which would not stand careful scrutiny because such
acceptance is mutually beneficial. (Risinger et al., 1989)
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In a masterpiece of world literature Mary Poppins—upon her return to the Banks family—immediately
goes on to enquire how the children have been behaving during her absence. Her pipeline to the
children’s soul is an oral ‘Thermometer’ which informs her reliably that Michael has been ‘Careless,
Thoughtless and Untidy’ (Travers, 2008: 156). Adults and, arguably, children find this amusing, as they
can tell the difference between fiction and science, i.e. between reality and literature. Or can they?
Recent developments regarding the proliferation of pseudo-scientific methods in the criminal
justice system are blurring the lines between informed decision-making processes and fact-finding
dystopia/science fiction, i.e. between reliable technical devices on the one hand and non-theoretical
understanding of human traits and normative concepts such as truthfulness and deception on the other
hand. More specifically, the notorious polygraph test is enjoying an unmistakable resurgence of usage.
In England and Wales lie-detector tests are currently in use by Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation
Service (hereinafter: HMPPS) to monitor sex offenders on parole and manage their level of compli-
ance. Sections 28–30 of the Offender Management Act 2007 enable a ‘polygraph condition’ to be
inserted in the release licence of released sexual offenders.1 This is not a negligible development,
given the fact that nowadays sexual offenders amount to ca. one fifth of the prison population and one
tenth of offenders under probation supervision (see Stacey, 2019: 5). What is more, there are real
stakes in the use of the polygraph test. Individuals who have been found in breach of their licence
conditions may be recalled and return to prison at the instigation of their offender manager (for an
overview see HPPS, 2019). The remit of the polygraph test is expected to expand with provisions in the
Domestic Abuse Bill2 and the Counter-terrorism and Sentencing Bill (see Ministry of Justice, 2020a)
respectively. Finally, the pilot scheme ‘Choices and Consequences’ (C2) run by Hertfordshire Con-
stabulary ‘aims to steer prolific, acquisitive criminals away from a life of crime’ by offering a
‘voluntary lie detector test’ (see Hertfordshire Constabulary, 2019). At the same time the EU has
already funded and employed at several airports security systems whose main objective is to secure the
external borders of member states with technologies that are ‘ranging from biometric verification [to]
automated deception detection’.3
Zombie forensics
The examples listed above show that it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the possibility
that the major shift in our approach to crime detection and risk-management signals a feature, not
a bug in the system. There can be no doubt that the polygraph test is ante portas—again. Now,
the question is: Why is the polygraph increasingly gaining traction? What makes it so appealing
that legal systems jettison fundamental evidential principles or, most importantly, one of their
core tenets, i.e. rationality, by forcing subjects to undergo polygraph tests? I cannot stress enough
that ever since the first deployment of the polygraph criminal courts,4 scientific institutions,5
1. The relevant offences are specified in Part 2 of Schedule 15 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In April 2009, the National
Offender Management Service (NOMS), as it then was, and more specifically the Offender Management and Public Protection
Group (OMPPG), began piloting mandatory polygraph testing for sexual offenders in nine probation trusts in the East and West
Midlands Regions. See Gannon et al. (2012). As I will show later in this paper, it is not random that this study (conveniently)
focuses on the utility of the polygraph, not the validity thereof.
2. See the government’s policy paper (Home Office, 2020).
3. Such are the so-called ‘Intelligent Portable Control Systems’ (iBorderCtrl, 2019).
4. See only Frye v United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. See e.g. NRC Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph (National Research Council, 2003); see also
Office of Technology Assessment (1983). The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure had considered the introduction of the
polygraph test into England and Wales. Their conclusion, however, was that the polygraph’s ‘lack of certainty from an
Kotsoglou 17
military organisations6 and last but not least, academic discourse7 have continuously and almost
unanimously discredited the polygraph as regards its validity in fact-finding processes. What is
more, the very scientific paradigm in psychology which propelled the polygraph into existence
has receded due to its lack of methodology, indefensible empirical basis and thus deficient
validity (see the next section).
In this paper I will argue that lie-detection is a zombie evidential idea insofar as it has been refuted
repeatedly (see also Quiggin, 2012). Despite structural and logico-grammatical inconsistencies embo-
died by massive empirical failures, the polygraph keeps coming back to public discourse by re-entering
the toolkit of criminal justice systems. Partly because the common-sense notion that ‘lies can be
detected’ remains prone to bogus theorising, and partly because law enforcement can thus knowingly
use pseudo-scientific methods in order to gain leverage and extract adverse statements from suspects and
convicted offenders, the very idea of the polygraph refuses to die. Time and again humans have tried to
articulate a methodological framework which would render rationally validated (scientific) conclusions
about the truth-value of a statement: trials of fire and water; asking the defendant to thrust his arm into a
cauldron of boiling water and fish out a ring; torture; use of the polygraph. These are all instantiations of
a recurrent theme in the history of the criminal justice system which purports to establish scientific fact-
finding methods. I call this phenomenon zombie forensics. This paper will focus on the polygraph and
examine its use through the lens of English and Welsh law of evidence.
Before I undertake that project, it is imperative, first, to stop and check our bearings by looking at the
theoretical underpinnings of the polygraph test.8 I will show that the central claim for the understanding
of the polygraph—i.e. the presupposition that the polygraph indicates deception—is inextricably linked
to an obsolete and abandoned paradigm in psychology (Introspection). The polygraph results are based
on erroneous assumptions and evaporate under closer scrutiny. By going back to the underlying psy-
chological concept of psychophysical parallelism I will explain why, occasionally, it’s not a bad idea to
throw away the baby (lie detection) with the bathwater (scientific paradigm) (see ‘The theoretical
underpinnings of lie-detection’ section). Secondly, I will draw attention to first principles in the law
of evidence especially the general ban on opinion evidence and the requirement for reliability. This
cardinal feature of English law of evidence, i.e. the requirement that expert evidence has a sufficiently
reliable scientific basis, explains why polygraph evidence cannot be adduced in the criminal process (see
‘The law of expert evidence in England and Wales’ section). Thirdly, I will draw attention to the use of
polygraph tests in the context of probation pursuant to the Offender Management Act 2007. The use of
the polygraph faces all the usual problems: lack of validity, lack of consistency due to the arbitrary
character of polygraph interviews, which invokes Articles 5 and 8 ECHR, and the need to use deception
and psychological manipulation in order to convince the subject that the polygraph works. What is more,
the combination of inadmissibility of the polygraph in the criminal process and its use from probation
services creates, finally, a major contradiction which is detrimental to the integrity of the legal order. For
the dissociation of standards for legal validity turns out to be a thorn in the side of the legal system whose
unity is threatened. By using zombie forensics the legal system jeopardises its normative cohesion,
indeed its identity, in order to serve the extraction imperative (see ‘The use of the polygraph in England
and Wales’ section).
evidential point of view told against its introduction in this country for the purpose of court proceedings’ (Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure, 1981: para. 4.76).
6. A report, prepared for the US Department of Defence by the Institute for Defense Analysis, was submitted on 31 July 1962; it
was immediately classified as it undermined the reliability of lie-detector tests. Cited by Alder (2007: 254).
7. A report from the British Psychological Society (1986) also argued that the polygraph was unscientific. See also British
Psychological Society (2004).
8. The critical reader might argue that this discussion is redundant, for it has been well established in literature that the polygraph
test lacks validity. The reality on the ground, however, and the fact that the polygraph is currently in use by probation services in
England and Wales, forces us to reopen a seemingly resolved discussion.
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The theoretical underpinnings of lie-detection
Psychophysical parallelism?
To address the empirical failures of the polygraph test in criminal adjudication, we need, first, to sketch
the basic contours of the logico-grammatical context which gave birth to the very idea of automated lie-
detection. Embedding the polygraph in its genetic framework has a pivotal role insofar as it is widely
held that the basic theory of polygraph testing is ‘only partially developed and researched’ (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1983: 101). What is striking about the polygraph, I will argue, is not its ability
to measure (usually: three) physiological changes associated with parts of the central nervous system
largely outside conscious control (see the Office of Technology Assessment, 1983: 11); for the data
which the polygraph records are as such void of meaning. Interesting and in need of critical assessment is
the conceptual and ideological framework which turns raw data into information, i.e. the reductionist
claims according to which epistemic/psychological concepts such as deception or truthfulness can be
reliably indicated by physiological measurement.
Crucial for the understanding of the polygraph is the presupposition that ‘deception and truthfulness
reliably elicit different psychological states across examinees’ (National Research Council, 2003: 65)
and in particular that ‘the polygraph is a device that measures certain physiological responses [ . . . ]
which are thought to indicate whether the subject is lying’ (see e.g. National Offender Management
Service (UK), 2015: para 1.4). The direct link between psychological and physiological states did not
come out of thin air. On the contrary, it is inextricably linked to an obsolete and discredited paradigm in
psychology (i.e. Introspection).9 This matters for the simple reason that the hardware underpinning the
polygraph has hardly changed since the invention of the latter in the 1920s.10
One of the characteristic doctrines of Introspection is the so-called psychophysical parallelism
according to which mental processes run parallel to physiological ones (Wundt, 1902)—an idea which
proved to be the fulcrum point for the polygraph. Although the field did not survive the 1920s—too
many were its internal methodological inconsistencies and idealisations, especially the naı̈ve belief in
the discriminatory power of self-observation11—one of the main figures of the field, Hugo Münsterberg,
continued the search for a pipeline to the soul, disseminating the ideas of introspection to scholars in
Harvard and, as it turned out, the whole of US.12 Münsterberg’s credo that physiological processes occur
in tandem with cognitive processes made him believe that he could solve in a scientific (i.e. replicable)
manner the deep problem of providing the criterion of truth,13 for he was unsatisfied with ‘the crudest
standards of easy going-psychology’ with which factual claims are assessed by juries and judges
(Münsterberg, 1908: 150 and 139). He envisaged a scientific way to ‘trace emotions’ and discriminate
between truthful statements and deception by capturing the involuntary symptoms of the emotions
(movements, breathing or pulse) which were ‘too weak to be noticed by the ordinary observer’ (Mün-
sterberg, 1908: 138–139, 111 and 114–116).
9. The historical origins of the core concept underlying the polygraph can be traced back to 1879 when Wilhelm Wundt
established the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig/Germany. Wundt’s research programme used a method of inquiry called
introspection with the aim od injecting hard-nosed objectivity into the nebulous phenomenology of the workings of the mind.
The aspiration was that introspection would provide a direct pipeline to one’s soul. For more discussion see Anderson (2015:
4–6).
10. For more discussion see Oswald (2020); cf. Schauer (2012).
11. In what was perhaps the most clear-cut paradigm shift in the field of psychology, Introspection was superseded by
Behaviourism.
12. Münsterberg was recruited by William James, i.e. the main figure of American introspection, to assume leadership of Har-
vard’s experimental psychology lab. Hugo Münsterberg came to Harvard in 1892 with a doctorate in psychology, earned under
the supervision of Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig.
13. For more discussion on this problem see Striker (1996: 22–76).
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The aspiration of a scientific approach to fact-finding, especially Münsterberg’s plan to build a
registering apparatus for a reliable detection of definite relations ‘between feelings and arm movements’
(Münsterberg, 1908: 120), remained for some time unfulfilled. The missing link between the theoretical
blueprint and its industrial application is, knowingly, William Marston who, acting on the suggestion of
his instructor at Harvard, i.e. Münsterberg, built a device recording changes in cardiovascular activity,
breathing and skin conductance. Marston was thus responsible for the first attempt to execute Münster-
berg’s project of ‘determining the truth or falsity of various elements in a witness’ story’.14
It is thus safe to conclude that the polygraph weaves itself seamlessly into the fabric of an identifiable
and obsolete paradigm in psychology and suffers from its conceptual and design errors including the
reductionist idea that we can break psychological concepts down to their individual components without
losing essential properties of the whole, or the assumption that deception and truthfulness could elicit in
a consistent and detectable way physiological states across interviewees. As every blue-ribbon commit-
tee on the validity of the polygraph reports, the ‘stress response’ to be measured can be triggered by a
host of factors. There is simply no unique physiological indicator that reflects a single underlying
process, let alone deception (see e.g. British Psychological Society, 2004: 29; National Research
Council, 2003: 78).
All in all, the realisation that there is no known physiological response which would be unique to
deception, or indeed to any other cognitive state, pushes a sharp needle into the theory underpinning the
polygraph.
Stimulation test
The intrinsic problems of the theory underlying the polygraph mean that the latter’s output cannot be
pregnant with meaning. It can only register neutral physiological data. As a result, Marston’s device
would never yield any information,15 let alone reliable conclusions about truthfulness. In other words,
whereas Marston laid the groundwork for the failed hardware, it was Keeler who developed the ‘inter-
rogation rituals’ for what we call today the polygraph test.16 Only the latter enables the operator to
extract adverse statements from the interviewee. It is important to stress that Keeler, who patented his
personal interview choreography, identified a problem and developed a solution to it, the so-called
‘stimulation test’.17 We need therefore to keep these two parts separate. The polygraph test cannot be
reduced to the polygraph, i.e. the rather banal technology. Crucial is thus not the device, but the
underlying interview logic which aims at eliciting confessions. Note that even polygraph operators
make clear that polygraphy is primarily ‘a psychological procedure and only secondarily of a physio-
logical nature’ (e.g. Abrams, 1978: 178). It is to this ritual that I shall now turn.
A pivotal role in the polygraph test is played by the stimulation alias ‘stim’ test, which is deployed ‘in
order to enhance the subject’s responsiveness through psychological means’ (e.g. Abrams, 1978: 178).
Although its declared purpose is to inform the examined person that the polygraph instruments are
‘properly adjusted’ (Decker, 1978: 176) to them and that the examination is being ‘professionally
conducted’, its real purpose is to convince subjects of the accuracy of the polygraph examination and
that any untruthful statement ‘will be very obvious to the examiner’ (see Barland and Raskin, 1973;
Office of Technology Assessment, 1983: 12–13).
I take this to be by far the most important aspect of the polygraph examination, for the examinee’s
(lack of) ‘belief’ in the validity of the polygraph or the examiner will also determine the structure of the
interview. If the examinee declares that he does not ‘believe in the polygraph’, then, as experienced
14. Marston (1921: 566). The modern polygraph was patented for use in criminal investigations by Leonard Keeler in 1939.
15. Note that the notions ‘data’ and information are not equivalent.
16. As Alder (2007: 81) points out, the ‘software’ constituted Keeler’s ‘true innovation’.
17. Terminology varies. I will use the term ‘stimulation test’ as it is more accurate. See also Office of Technology Assessment
(1983) and NRC Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph (National Research Council, 2003).
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polygraphers recommend, certain steps need to be taken in order to ‘affirm the subject’s knowledge of
the effectiveness of the procedure’ (Hickman, 1978: 184) and thus instil fear of detection. In that case,
the stim-test is conducted before the main part of the inteview. What is more, the examiner is instructed
to use the word ‘acquaintance or demonstration test’ so that the examinee thinks that this is a trivial
procedure for adjusting tubes and instruments, while at the same time the psychological test induces the
false belief about the validity of the polygraph—generating thus the necessary ‘psychological climate’
(Office of Technology Assessment, 1983: 12–18) for the test.
Painting with a broad brush, we can say that there are two main categories of ritualistic lie-detection
techniques employed to extract adverse statements. The first one is based itself on outright deception.
The interviewee is often instructed to select from a deck a card which is secretly marked or otherwise
adapted so that the examiner knows the correct answer.18 For example, according to the manual issued
by the US Department of Defense, the examiner receives the following instructions:
Administer a standard known solution numbers test [ . . . ]. DO NOT show the test to the examinee, but
convince the examinee that deception was indicated. (US Department of Defense, 1997: 31–34, emphasis as
in original)
At the end, the examiner will merely announce the predetermined ‘results’ using the following words:
‘You’re not capable of lying without your body reacting [ . . . ] That will make this examination very easy
to complete as long as you follow my directions’ (US Department of Defense, 1997: 35). This psycho-
logical trick aims at maximising the subject’s anxiety and as a result the subject’s responsiveness. The
first category looks thus more like a travesty of an interview19 than a test.
In the second category there is no stacked deck at play. Nevertheless, the examiner will follow a
similar procedure by asking the subject to choose a number between 30 and 36, say. The examiner will
then ask the interviewee which number he has chosen whilst he instructs him to answer ‘No’ to every
question,20 forcing him thus to lie:
Then the polygraph operator will try to guess the number that the examinee picked based on the
physiological data. Thereupon he asks whether the subject had picked the number 33, say, and ‘receives
the subject’s assurance that the card identified by the examiner was in fact the card chosen by the
subject’ (Senese, 1978: 200, emphasis added).
This is an astonishing insight, for, in effect, polygraph examiners concede that there is no methodologi-
cally valid way to assess the accuracy of the examiner’s guess other than a co-operating/mystified subject. Of
all things it is the interviewee who confirms whether the polygrapher’s best guess was accurate. This means,
however, that by relying on the interviewee to make factual determinations, we go back to our starting point.
The only difference is that during that process the ritual sets the stage for the psychological manipulation and
the extraction of statements. The polygraph operator achieves that by distracting the subject from the very
fact that the polygraph examination gravitates towards extracting information by making ‘a “believer” out of
the examinee’ (Hickman, 1978: 182)—not by detecting anything (meaningful).
In other words, as soon as the subject believes in the infallibility of lie detection the bogus pipeline
effect kicks in. Because the subject operates on the wrongful basis that the polygraph test (a) works
independently and (b) will reflect his true attitude, and because he does not wish to be second-guessed by
the machine, he will feel pressured to disclose adverse statements (Jones and Sigall, 1971). This suffices
to show why the stim-test is considered to be an ‘indispensable’21 part of the examination.
18. As Alder (2007: 83), explains, Keeler himself often used his skills as an amateur magician to stack the deck.
19. Term used in R v Paris, Miller and Abdullahi (1993) 97 Cr App R 99 (CA) at 104.
20. The questions will thus be the following:’Did you choose the number 30?Did you choose the number 31? . . . Did you choose
the number 36?’
21. Office of Technology Assessment (1983: 12). According to s. 5(3) of the Polygraph Rules 2009 (SI 1999 No. 619): ‘A
polygraph session must include a pre-test interview, one or more polygraph examinations and a post-test interview.’
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The polygraph test relies thus on an unjustifiable assumption. We conclude that every polygraph
operator faces an unpalatable dilemma: Either to inform the subject that the polygraph test lacks
scientific validity or to deploy a psychological procedure (stim-test) based on false statements in order
to extract a confession. The field of polygraphy choose persistently the latter—among other things
through demonstrably false empirical claims. Such is the claim that there is a ‘unique pattern of response
for specific emotional states’ (see e.g. Abrams, 1978: 178–179). The ritual deployed by polygraph
examiners can thus safely be regarded as deceptive and fraudulent (see British Psychological Society,
2004: 27).
The law of expert evidence in England and Wales
Notwithstanding the lack of methodological validity (established in the previous section) of the poly-
graph test, legal questions of relevance, admissibility and the decision-making prerogative should not
take the form of afterthoughts and normative side-constraints to a supposedly existing institutional
reality. From a doctrinal point of view, both epistemic objectives and the sufficiency of grounds for
any investigative method are themselves normatively constituted. Remember that the criminal process is
a normatively structured decision-making process under uncertainty (for more discussion see Roberts,
2018: 46). As a result, we need to examine the procedural architecture of the process of gathering and
assessing (expert) evidence. The insurmountable—as I think—problems surrounding the admissibility
of polygraph evidence pertain to two basic requirements: (a) reliability and (b) legitimacy.
Reliability
We saw above that polygraphy is based on the notion that the act of deception produces a stress response
in the autonomic nervous system which ‘can be recorded and then interpreted by the polygraph exam-
iner’ (Stockdale and Grubin, 2012: 233, emphasis added). The need for interpretation of the recorded
data, i.e. the diagnosis of truthfulness or deception, invokes a cardinal feature of English and Welsh
evidence law, i.e. the opinion rule.22 We need therefore to examine thoroughly the reasons for or against
the admissibility of polygraphy output. According to traditional evidence law doctrine, experts will
present fact-finders with physical rules or general principles and help them apply the domain-specific
general knowledge to the evidence introduced in the case. The term ‘help’ is doing here the conceptual
heavy lifting—in more ways than one. The expert witness is bound to testify only within his or her area
of expertise insofar as any step outside that strictly circumscribed area constitutes a procedurally for-
bidden invasion of the fact-finder’s province.23 Within the exclusionary scope of the opinion rule fall
expert witnesses who draw inferences, speculate or make value judgments about the facts of the case—
pre-empting thus the decisions of the fact-finder. Lawton LJ’s enduring dictum in Turner which pre-
dicates admissibility on necessity, sets the tone in this area of law: ‘If on the proven facts a judge or jury
can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary’.24
As regards the question of what exactly constitutes expert evidence, English and Welsh law had long
adopted a default approach of laxity.25 This has raised the central question of the reliability of expert
evidence. Whereas in the US, say, this discussion has been going on at least since Frye26—coinciden-
tally: this is the same DC Court of Appeals’ decision (US) which declared the use of the polygraph
22. Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 CA. Common law has erected already since the late 18th century a general ban on opinion
evidence in order to entrench the decision-making prerogative of the fact-finder. The early leading case is Folkes v Chadd
(1782) 3 Doug KB 157.
23. R v Davies [1962] 3 All ER 97.
24. Turner [1975] QB 834 at 841 CA.
25. See e.g. Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766.
26. Frye v United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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inadmissible—the legal system in England and Wales has long neglected the formulation of such
criteria.27
Expert evidence needs to be helpful, but then the question is: under which circumstances can and
should the opinion rule be qualified? In Dlugosz the Court of Appeal (EþW) established that in
determining the issue of admissibility, the court must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable
scientific basis for the evidence to be admitted.28 Obviously, there is reliability and reliability. Lacking a
hotline to objective reality, the judge is not given unbridled discretion to make this determination during
an assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the proffered expert evidence is
scientifically valid (reliable). The soft law regime comprising the Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR)
and Criminal Practice Direction (CPD) introduces gatekeeping standards and sets out factors which the
court should consider vis-à-vis inferential ‘strengths’29 and ‘weaknesses’30 of the expert evidence.
Applied to our current discussion, the polygraph test is, first, based on an ‘unjustifiable assumption’31
(i.e. the idea of detectability of deception via scientific means) which in evidential terms has unequi-
vocally failed ‘to stand up to scrutiny’.32 For this in effect reductionist picture of the human mind derives
from a deeply problematic and obsolete research program in psychology.33 What is more, the poly-
grapher would struggle to report whether he or she ‘followed established practice in the field’.34 It is
common knowledge that there are no such standards due to the very nature of an interview being bespoke
to the respective individual (see Kotsoglou and Oswald (2020) for more discussion).
This relates to the second point: The polygraph ‘test’ does not generate any scientific data insofar as
an interview is not a replicable process.35 In criminal adjudication there is no universe of John-Lennon-
shootings in which we can count how many times he was shot by MD Chapman and the number of times
that someone else was the culprit. No two cases are the same, or as David Simon—of the TV show ‘The
Wire’ fame—put it: ‘God is a first-rate novelist’ (Simon, 1992: xi). What is more, early on in the history
of the polygraph it became clear that ‘wide divergence’ in the structure of the respective interview is
inevitable due to the ‘widely varying types of questions, examiners, and examinees’ (Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, 1983: 11). The complex interaction between the examiner and the examinee show
that lack of standardisation signals a feature, not a bug in the system. The polygraph test’s output is thus
deprived of any generality. It creates, oddly, a reference class with a single member, or more accurately
as many reference classes as interviewees. The very term we use is a misnomer, for what is often and
rather uncritically referred to as the polygraph test is actually an infinitely long set of malleable interview
rituals (Office of Technology Assessment, 1983: 11). Proponents of the use of polygraphs choose to
ignore the common-sense fact that human interaction, especially the ascription of truthfulness, are highly
context-sensitive and thus antithetical to the general formulation which is a feature salient in science.
The third point is a direct result of the first two: Even if the underlying method were valid (NB: it
isn’t!), the model would not be a simplified version of any real phenomenon. The complexity of real-life
27. These concerns led the Law Commission to recommend significant reforms, including the enactment of a new statutory test of
admissibility requiring opinion evidence to have ‘sufficient reliability’ to be admitted. The government, being worried about
the flood of appeals and resulting increase in the budget, declined to give effect to the Commission’s proposals in primary (i.e.
binding) legislation, but suggested that they should be incorporated into the soft law regime. See Law Commission (2011:
para. 1.8).
28. R v Dlugosz and Others [2013] EWCA Crim 2, at [11]—emphasis added; see Tony Ward, Explaining and trusting expert
evidence: What is a ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’? In: International Journal of Evidence & Proof 24(3): 233–254.
29. Criminal Practice Directions 2015 Division V Evidence (as amended) para 19A.5.
30. CPD 2015 V para. 19A.6.
31. CPD 2015 V para. 19A.6(b).
32. CPD 2015 V para. 19A.6(a).
33. For a philosophical discussion on this see McGinn (1997: 147).
34. CPD 2015 V para. 19A.5(h). See also the reference to the ‘applicable standards of the American Polygraph Association’ in The
Polygraph Rules 2009 (SI 1999 No. 619), Sched. 1.
35. CPD 2015 V para. 19A.6.(c).
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cases adjudicated in the criminal justice system outstrips anything to be found in the psychologist’s
laboratory. The core reason for the insufficiency of the method’s reliability is not the fact that polygraph
tests can discriminate lying from truth telling at rates ‘well below perfection although above chance’.36
This would confuse cause and effect. In order to solve the—as I think, insurmountable—problem of
replicability for real events, researchers simplify case studies to the point of unimportance. Remember
that subjects of psychological research are instructed to imagine themselves committing a mock crime
e.g. by ‘stealing’ something in the room. This would, in the researchers’ aspiration, create an emotional
potential with which to experiment. This is, however, an experiment with the wrong type of guinea pigs
(see already Lee, 1952: 25), for the forensic context is wildly dissimilar to the laboratory conditions
outlined above. Real people involved in the criminal justice system have real stakes, complex motiva-
tions and recollections of events. Empirical research in that area suffers from a lack of realism which is a
precondition of validity. The reason for that is what empirical researchers coin the ‘base rate problem’.
As Gudjonsson explains, ‘[a]t the most basic level we do not know the proportion of suspects inter-
rogated at police stations who are genuinely guilty of the offence of which they are accused. This makes
it impossible to estimate the frequency with which false confessions occur’ (Gudjonsson, 2003: 173; see
Kotsoglou and Oswald (2020) for more discussion).
Starting from the premise that validity refers to the extent to which a test does measure what it aspires
to measure, we conclude that issues around the validity of studies on confessions (with or without the use
of the polygraph) are unsettlable, for it is hard to evaluate the extent to which empirical claims are
verified (Risinger et al., 1989: 736–737). Has the person who made a confession statement really
committed a crime? Or do they display interrogative suggestibility? No one can tell. What is more,
tests are conducted (a) in laboratory settings and (b) in populations of examinees untrained in counter-
measures. We cannot therefore generalise these results to real-world settings. Even a high percentage of
diagnosticity does not pertain directly to the real world of defendants whose liberty, livelihood, and
reputation depends on the outcome of the process.37
Finally, it should be obvious that concluding whether a statement is truthful or not contains strong
decisional elements. Now, the question is: Who is authorised by the legal order to make this (non-
scientific) decision? The polygrapher or the fact-finder? In evidential terms, the question is the follow-
ing: What is the ‘proper’ way to draw an inference? The Criminal Practice Directions (para 19A.6.(e))
send us of course back to the grammar of the criminal process, the decision-making prerogative (see
Kotsoglou, 2020: 86–89). I cannot stress enough that legal orders have their own established routines for
drawing properly an inference or conclusion as regards credibility of a witness or accuracy of a state-
ment. Note that the criminal process is not a proto-scientific apparatus soon to be replaced by a ripe
scientific method, let alone by zombie forensics, but an advanced institutional tool designed for partic-
ular kinds of work in the social arena. The criminal process is not a ‘cheap substitute’ (see Midgley,
2001: 11 for more discussion) or a half-baked routine for folk-validation due to be replaced by the proper
routines of experts. The idea that some scientifically validated (therefore: general) proposition—let
alone a pseudo-scientific one—could ever guarantee the factual rectitude let alone the lawfulness of a
legal decision commits the fallacy of taking inferential steps based on assumptions that go beyond what
36. This is one of the fundamental conclusions of the NRC Committee to Review the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph
(National Research Council, 2003: 4).
37. The rectitude of a criminal verdict is to be assessed against legal standards for normatively structured persuasion, not against
some fixed proposition such as ‘assume that you have stolen a pencil’. Psychologists create a context in which the truth of a
proposition is artificially fixed. This is a methodological necessity for meaningful empirical inquiries. Propositions with fixed
truth-values allow empirical researchers to go on and examine whether, and to what extent, a lie can be detected. In criminal
adjudication, however, the exact opposite is the case. By arguing that psychological research, let alone of the type discussed
here, is directly applicable to real-life scenarios, proponents of the polygraph conflate two inverse conditional probabilities,
i.e. the probability of detection given a false statement confession, and the probability of a false statement given an indication
of deception.
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can be logically warranted by the underlying procedure (for more discussion see Biedermann et al.,
2008).
For all these reasons, it is safe to assume that it would be a fool’s errand to even contemplate
introducing the polygraph into the criminal process; assessed against the evidential standards for the
admissibility of criminal evidence in England and Wales polygraphers would sooner rather than later
meet their procedural Waterloo.
Legitimacy of confession
Regardless of the various issues around validity of the underlying method, the use of deception and
psychological manipulation as indispensable part of the polygraph interview are just another thorn in the
side of polygraph evidence. We saw above that the polygraph technique depends on a great deal of
evocative stage-setting which conveys the implicit and explicit message that untruthfulness will be
detected. These are false representations vis-à-vis the truth-conducive character of the polygraph ‘test’,
which in other circumstances—e.g. if made for gain—would enter the scope of anti-fraud criminal
provisions.
In view of the deception involved in the polygraph test itself, it is highly unlikely that confessions
triggered by the polygraph would survive the two-stage reasoning process of a criminal court judge (ss.
76(2) and 78 of PACE). Defence counsel tend to rely on both, for courts have not clearly indicated on
which section they rely in holding that the respective confession is to be excluded. Required is only that
the breach of verballing provisions is ‘significant and substantial’.38 Note also that s. 76(2)(a) of PACE,
which replaced the voluntariness rule at common law, disconnects the veracity of the confession from its
legitimacy.39 A knee-jerk reaction from proponents of the polygraph would focus on the meaning of
‘oppression’. One might wonder: does the polygraph test really qualify as oppressive?
The remit of oppression which is partially defined in s. 76(8) of PACE, also includes deception. For
example, it was held in Mason that a lie told by the police—that the defendant’s fingerprints had been
found on an article used in the offence—should have resulted in exclusion of his confession under s. 78.
For the trial judge had failed to take into account the deception practised not only on the defendant,
which, as the Court of Appeal stressed, ‘is bad enough’, but also upon the latter’s solicitor. Had the trial
judge included the deceit practised upon the appellant and his solicitor in his consideration of the matter,
Watkins LJ noted, they ‘have not the slightest doubt that he would have been driven to an opposite
conclusion, namely, that the confession be ruled out and the jury not permitted therefore to hear of it’.
‘Hoodwinking’ the defendant through deception, the Court of Appeal noted, ‘was a most reprehensible
thing to do’.40 Heron41 is another case which dealt with coercive tactics employed by the police. It was
held that the use of deliberate deception on a suspect may contribute to a finding of oppression. The court
judge excluded the defendant’s confession on the grounds both of verballing during the interview and the
lies told to the latter that allegedly two witnesses had identified the latter as being at the spot where the
murdered girl was last seen alive. It is highly doubtful whether in similar circumstances a direction to
the jury about the need for special would remedy the trial judge’s failure to exclude the confession under
ss. 76(2) and 78 of PACE.42
We should not forget at this juncture that confessions have historically been useful instruments for
securing convictions. The criminal justice system, however, is acutely aware of their intrinsic problems
too. Ever since the 18th century it has been regarded as an uncontroversial view that over-reliance on the
38. Absolam (1988) 88 Cr App R 322; Keenan [1990] 2 QB 54.
39. It is interesting that NIISSG (2014: 2f) admits/concedes that: ‘[g]iven the concerns raised in literature and the calibre of the
experts involved it is very unlikely that any challenge to the use of the polygraph could be comprehensively rebutted’.
40. Mason [1987] 3 All ER 481.
41. R. v Heron, The Times, 22 November 1993.
42. R v Moss (1990) 91 Cr App R 371.
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defendant’s confession statements counts among the most significant causes of miscarriages of justice.43
As Beccaria explained, it is not the actual events of the alleged crime that are unravelled before the eyes
of the oppressive investigator but the strength ‘of the will of the accused’. The ‘very means employed to
distinguish the innocent from the guilty’ will make the difference between them disappear, so that we,
ultimately, get information about ‘the force of the muscles and the sensibility of the nerves’ of the
accused person rather than a truth-conducive statement.44 In the polygraph context, we are not dealing of
course with physical pain, but with psychological pressure. We are not operating on the basis of the
(false) assumption that ‘God will give the defendant the strength to endure’; the explicit assumption
though that the device will detect untruthful statements is playing the same role. I think, therefore, that
the difference between torture and the polygraph is a matter of degree, not category (see Kotsoglou,
2015). Remember that the main function of the stim-test is to instil fear of detection. In a similar way to
torture, suggestibility is not a reliable or legitimate way of conducting an interview as it generates
confession statements while at the same time it inflates their probative force. All in all, although there
is little to no judicial authority regarding the admissibility of polygraph evidence—scholars even speak
of a general assumption of inadmissibility (Dennis, 2017: Ch. 14-005)—we should not misinterpret
silence as legal uncertainty. English and Welsh law’s demands for non-oppressive interrogation and
reliable confessions as outlined above sketch the contours of the institutional and procedural framework
which should exclude polygraph evidence from any criminal trial. In fact, in every Western legal order
that I know of, polygraph evidence does not pass the admissibility test. To be more precise, the very
efforts to introduce the polygraph or other unscientific methods into the criminal process have, histori-
cally, shaped the criteria for the admissibility of expert evidence.
The use of the polygraph in England and Wales
All rosy in the garden?
Now that we have examined the legal framework underlying the obtaining, admissibility and use of
confession statements (see the previous section), we can return to the issue which necessitates this
discussion, i.e. the current use of the polygraph in England and Wales.
As outlined above, ss. 28–30 of the Offender Management Act 2007 enable a polygraph condition to
be inserted in the release licence of certain sexual offenders as specified in the Act. More specifically, s.
30(1) of the 2007 Act stipulates that evidence of any matter mentioned during the polygraph session may
not be used in any proceedings against the interviewee/released person for an offence. The aforemen-
tioned matters could be either statements made by the released person while participating in a polygraph
session or any physiological reactions of the released person while being questioned in the course of a
polygraph examination (s. 30(2)(a–b) of the 2007 Act). Furthermore, according to the ‘Polygraph
Examination Instructions’ (hereafter: PEI) an indication of deception (hereafter: DI) is not in itself a
breach of the licence condition: ‘Any statement made or physiological reaction of the released person
during the polygraph session would not be evidence that the released person had breached his/her licence
condition and should not lead to enforcement proceedings being undertaken’. Enforcement proceedings
due to breach of licence may follow, only if the offender ‘admits or disclose about behaviour that would
43. The Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six are only a couple of miscarriages of justice. A substantial body of research is
showing a number of possible reasons why people may make false confessions, see The Royal Commission on Criminal
Justice (1993: 57) (the Runciman Report); see Gudjonsson (2003: 166–172).
44. Beccaria (1785: ch. XVI). Cesare Beccaria, co-initiator of the Enlightenment and father of modern criminal law theory, pushed
a sharp needle not only in the idea of torture as truth-conducive mechanism but, ultimately, in every pseudo-rational approach
to factual determination, such as of the type examined here. His analysis provided us with a guide to the demythologisation of
fact-finding methods which interfere with their very object of inquiry. Remember that polygraph operators interact with,
indeed actively manipulate, the participant before, during and after the examination.
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constitute a breach’ (see National Offender Management Service, 2015: Appendix 1, paras 2.92, 2.93,
and 3.41).
We seem thus to have a corroboration rule at play, according to which the result of the polygraph
examination cannot be used as an exclusive basis for decisions on the management of sex offenders (see
Kotsoglou and Oswald, 2020 for more discussion). One would thus be inclined to think that released
offenders have nothing to fear when instructed to undergo a polygraph session. But they do, and they
should. For the devil lies in the details of the PEI. As I will show below, the polygraph is, in effect, an
interrogation tool, another Trojan horse in which the extraction imperative is secreted under the veil of
technological progress. Its purpose and sole potential are not to detect truth, but to enable interviewers to
extract confession statements at the price of rationality and legitimacy—for three reasons (see Kotsoglou
and Oswald, 2020 for more discussion).
First, released offenders are forced to undergo polygraph sessions, insofar as ‘failure to attend or
comply with the polygraph session as instructed would constitute a breach of the licence condition’.45
Interestingly, the PEI thus sanction non-attendance of a pseudo-scientific interview ritual whose output
would be declared inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Once there, the offender must undergo a test
which can, of course, easily be tricked, and which cannot detect any unique physiological indication of
untruthfulness. As every blue-ribbon committee indefatigably has stressed, there is simply no unique
physiological indicator that reflects a single underlying psychological process, let alone deception (see
‘The theoretical underpinnings of lie-detection’ section).
Secondly, the unanimously accepted lack of linkage between psychological/normative concepts such
as truthfulness and physiological functions becomes relevant again, for, pursuant to para 2.74 PEI an
offender who has failed the test (DI) ‘will be given the opportunity to explain the test result in the post-
test phase of the examination’. This is ‘another opportunity’, the PEI state, to ‘disclose information’.
Repetitive use of the term ‘opportunity’, as evidenced above, distracts us from the fact that the polygraph
test is calibrated towards extracting confession statements by instilling fear of detection. Interrogative
suggestibility, as research clearly shows, appears to be significantly mediated by anxiety processes
(Gudjonsson, 2003: 148). Remember that a polygraph test is—unlike a routine visit to the GP—a ‘fairly
lengthy process’ which typically lasts ‘two or three hours’.46 The obligation of the interviewee to
provide an explanation with regards to a DI is highly informative for the simple reason that the PEI
do not regard—even from within the flawed logic of the polygraph—the very possibility of a false-alarm
as relevant. The offender must provide an explanation for an indication which, let me repeat, can be on
the polygraph’s own terms, a false positive. This is, I think, the exact point where the bogus-pipeline
effect kicks in once again (see ‘The theoretical underpinnings of lie-detection’ section). If deception is
indicated and the offender is not ‘forthcoming in offering any explanation’, then a ‘sound guiding
principle’ is to ‘address the issue “head on” with the offender and try to verify it’.47 But ‘challenging
the interviewee head on’ is nothing but a way to gain leverage based on malleable pseudo-scientific
output (see Kotsoglou and Oswald, 2020 for more discussion).
Released offenders who have not thoroughly researched the relevant literature or merely infer that the
polygraph must be a valid method—given that the HPPS deploys it—will find themselves under sig-
nificant psychological pressure. Add in the mix the fact that a disproportionate number of people under
probation supervision have special education needs; find hard to learn how to gauge risk or control
temper and other emotions; have substance issues; or suffer from anxiety, depression other mental health
45. PEI, Appendix 1, para. 2.94
46. See the CEO of the company who trains polygraph operators, Professor Don Grubin’s witness statement in: Parliamentary
Debates— House of Commons Official Report General Committees—Public Bill Committee—Counter-Terrorism and
Sentencing Bill—First Sitting Thursday 25 June 2020 (Morning). Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/
cmpublic/CounterTerrorism/PBC129_Counter-Terrorism_1st-4th_Combined_30_06_2020.pdf (accessed 02 July 2020).
47. PEI, Appendix 1 para. 2.8.5.
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conditions (Stacey, 2019: 6). These factors should highlight the considerable risk of coerced-compliant
or coerced-internalised false confessions (Gudjonsson, 2003: 193–196).
In brief, released offenders who are particularly susceptible to pressure are not only required to
undergo a polygraph test with the both implicit and explicit justification that it would reliably indicate
untruthfulness; they are also being put under pressure to explain a DI. It becomes thus apparent that—
starting from the stim-test over the length of the interview to the utilisation of DIs—psychological
manipulation and pressure are exerted continuously and increasingly until the offender makes an adverse
statement; the whole ritual as outlined above is calibrated towards that goal. Historically, confession
statements have been regarded as an evidential remedy for uncertain decision-makers and labyrinthine
sets of information. As the PEI openly admit: ‘offender managers sometimes struggle to decide on what
to do if the result was DI’.48
Thirdly, the very concept of ‘indicated deception’ seems to be highly problematic. As English courts
accept,49 ‘the examiner interprets the chart and indicates whether he or she believes that the interviewee
is being truthful or deceptive’.50 It remains doubtful on which evidential basis and according to which
inferential rules the examiner will draw rational conclusions with any probative force. We saw above
(see ‘The law of expert evidence in England and Wales’ section) that for the ban on opinion evidence to
be qualified, we would need a sufficiently reliable scientific basis, which, of course, is not available in
the context of the polygraph. Despite the opinion rule the legal order abdicates the decision-making
prerogative of authorised legal officials to polygraph examiners who will ‘interpret’ the data based on
invalid inferential rules. This situation is reminiscent of a man who supposedly feels in his hand ‘that the
water is three feet under the ground’ (Wittgenstein, 1991: 9). Undeniably, it is possible that we could find
water, but it’s not that ‘feeling in our hand’ that led us there! Similarly, we do not know how the
grammar of ‘believing that the interviewee is being truthful or deceptive’ relates to the grammar of
‘sufficient evidence’ and ‘reasonable grounds’—due to complete lack of explicit rules, which could
guide proper use of these terms. The legal order in the probation context tolerates that we do not apply
the requisite standard of proof in order to measure the examiners’ subjective beliefs. On the contrary, we
use the arbitrary interpretation of each chart to articulate the respective content of the standard of proof.
Ironically, the use of the polygraph which is supposed to be a measuring instrument, poses itself a
problem of measurement. Cryptic decisions based on inarticulate inferences and unbridled discretion are
a paradigmatic case of arbitrary decision-making.
Use immunity?
Let us now try to understand the typical scenario with which the UK Government advertises the use of
the polygraph in HPPS:
J is a 47 year old sexual offender [ . . . ] J was subject to mandatory polygraph testing as part of his release
following a nine-year custodial sentence. During the polygraph examination he denied any contact with
children under the age of 18 years. The test revealed he was attempting to be deceptive. The test was run a
second time and still produced a deceptive result. The polygraph examiner contacted the offender manager
who immediately contacted the police. The police were waiting for the offender when he returned to his
property and found three young boys and another adult in the house.
J was immediately recalled to custody. The police were able to make further investigations. (Ministry of
Justice, 2020b)
48. PEI, Appendix 1, para, 2.8.5.
49. Corbett v The Secretary of State for Justice & NOMS [2009] EWHC 2671 (Admin), para. 14. The HC cites here a guide for
offender managers which was, on 1 October 2008, issued by the Secretary of State under the heading ‘Mandatory Polygraphy
for Sex Offenders Pilots’.
50. PEI, Appendix 1, para. 3.3.2—emphasis added.
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The case-scenario—whether representative or not—raises serious questions as regards the lawful
character of police conduct. First, no polygraph results could ever ‘reveal’ that the interviewee is
‘attempting to be deceptive’. No set of physiological data can be reliably associated to specific psycho-
logical concepts. Let me stress once again that the key message in scientific literature is that there is
simply no unique physiological correlate that indicates deception. The Government’s case-scenario is
therefore misleading. Secondly, the case-scenario manifests that the Government pays lip service to the
use immunity enshrined in s. 30(1) OMA 2007. For the offender manager can inform the police about the
DI—remember that there are no clear rules as to what counts as DI—who will in turn investigate and secure
new (admissible) evidence. In absence of a strict exclusionary rule for the fruit of the poisonous tree
(remember that the use of deception renders the polygraph ‘poisonous’, see ‘The theoretical underpinnings
of lie-detection’ section), police forces seem willing to take their chances with the fruit of the polygraph.
The problem, however, is that although investigations and new evidence might be able to bypass the ss. 76
and 78 PACE 1984 exclusionary rules, they cannot distract us from the main issue at this juncture. Police
conduct hinges on the existence of reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence may have been
committed (PACE Code B, para 2.5 and 3.1). It is thus a contradiction in terms to base a suspicion for a
crime on the output of a device which lacks validity and as a result is inadmissible in criminal courts. The
legitimacy of police conduct fails on the reasonableness-requirement, for zombie forensics cannot provide
us with reasonable grounds (see Kotsoglou and Oswald, 2020 for more discussion).
Polygraph and human rights
The use of the polygraph in the context of probation can engage Article 5 (right to liberty and security of
the person) and Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private life). Unsurprisingly, in the UK Govern-
ment’s view the polygraph measures do not infringe Article 5 ‘as detention will be in accordance with
the sentence of imprisonment as set by the court’ (see Ministry of Justice, 2020c: para. 17). With regards
to Article 8 the High Court reaffirmed in Corbett the lawfulness of the polygraph—with similar argu-
ments as above. The claimant had challenged his polygraph licence condition imposed as part of the
initial pilot (see Gannon et al., 2012) as a disproportionate interference with Article 8. The High Court
disagreed. Although there was an interference, LJ Pill noted, this was deemed to be justified under
Article 8.2 grounds, given the seriousness of the initial (serious) sexual offences and the denial of those
offences by the claimant following his release on licence.51 Similarly, the UK Government asserts that
any interference is ‘justified [ . . . ] owing to the significant risk to the public potentially posed by this
cohort of offenders in the current environment’ (Ministry of Justice, 2020c, para. 70).
It is striking that in both the UK Government’s justification and the courts’ jurisprudence there is
barely any discussion about the necessity and proportionality of the polygraph, i.e. two central compo-
nents for assessing whether Article 5 of 8 ECHR has been infringed. Especially the High Court in
Corbett paid no attention to the operation of the polygraph itself and whether it was necessary for the
purposes of offender management in terms of its effectiveness and validity. Nor did the court weigh up
proportionality in accordance with the established four-stage proportionality test (see Kotsoglou and
Oswald, 2020 for more discussion). It is rather an implied assumption that mere compliance with
domestic law (Offender Management Act 2007) provides sufficient procedural guarantees against arbi-
trariness. It is to the latter that I shall now turn.52 In the following paragraphs I will thus briefly address a
common structural feature of both Articles 5 and 8 ECHR: the need for procedural safeguards against
arbitrariness and abuse.53
51. Corbett v Secretary of State for Justice & Anor [2010] HRLR 3, para. 31
52. A detailed discussion of the polygraph interview’s necessity and proportionality assessed against the background of the
ECtHR’s jurisprudence would go beyond the scope of this article. I do believe, however, that my analysis so far has made this
discussion redundant.
53. Roman Zakharov v Russia (47143/06) [GC], para. 270.
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It has been well established by several rulings of the Strasburg Court’s Grand Chamber that the key
purpose of Article 5 ECHR, is to prevent arbitrary or unjustified deprivation of liberty.54 But also in
respect of Article 8 ECHR the Strasburg Court has made clear that the State must organise the practical
implementation of measure in such a way as to prevent any abuse or arbitrariness.55 Proportionality and
procedural guarantees against arbitrariness are essential in that regard.56 Crucially, the requirement for
sufficiently clear rules concerns both the circumstances in which, and the conditions on which the
respective measures are carried out. If there is any risk of arbitrariness the law will not be compatible
with the lawfulness requirement.57 This is a point whose importance cannot be overstated—especially in
view of the implicit assumption outlined above which equates statutory conformity with lawfulness. The
notion of arbitrariness salient in the Convention rights extends beyond lack of conformity with domestic
law—in this case: ss. 28–30 OMA 2007. In effect, any deprivation of liberty might be ‘lawful’ in view of
domestic law,58 but still be arbitrary.59 Of course, the notion of arbitrariness can vary widely resembling
thus its jurisprudential mirror image, i.e. discretion. But the varying element are surface features, not
structural ones. I showed above that the polygraph test cannot be standardised due to the complexity of
the interview qua discursive phenomenon. Lack of standardisation necessitates ad-hoc improvisation so
that ultimately the term ‘test’ is a misnomer. What is more, the Strasburg Court has stressed that
arbitrariness may arise where there has been an element of bad faith or deception on the part of
authorities involved.60 This becomes again relevant since deception is built into the fabric of the
polygraph interview.
We conclude thus that the requirement of lawfulness is not satisfied merely by compliance with the
relevant domestic law; the latter must itself be in conformity with general principles salient in the
respective legal order including the Convention rights.61
Lack of integrity
We saw above that in view of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence62 any risk of arbitrariness is considered
incompatible with the lawfulness requirement. For the administration of the polygraph examination
cannot guarantee that like cases will be treated similarly and different cases differently. This is, however,
not the only problem. The use of the polygraph poses a serious threat for the very integrity of the legal
order.
Undoubtedly, the epistemic and normative objectives in the probation context are constituted in a
much different way than the set of rules permeating the criminal process. We cannot expect, indeed
desire, the same level of procedural and evidential guarantees across the criminal justice system.
However, a core minimum should be preserved. By deploying interview rituals masqueraded as tech-
nological solutions which on their own terms lack scientific validity, we jeopardise not just the ration-
ality of a legal order, but, most importantly, some of its structural features: its normative cohesion and
integrity. From the premise that integrity is the surface feature of a set of institutional practices and
procedures permeated by the same core values, or at least values which are not directly contradicting
each other, we conclude that the use of unreliable methods in allegedly siloed parts of the criminal justice
system jeopardises the unity of law. What is more, the above-mentioned interview rituals are even
54. S., V. and A. v Denmark [GC]—35553/12, 36678/12 and 36711/12; McKay v the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 543/03, ECHR
2006-X).
55. Dumitru Popescu v Romania (No 2) (App. no. 71525/01).
56. Bărbulescu v Romania [GC] (App. no. 61496/08), para. 119–122.
57. Bykov v Russia [GC] (App. no. 4378/02), para. 78–79
58. By that I mean the individual Act of statute, not the legal order as a whole.
59. Creangă v Romania [GC] (App. no. 29226/03), para. 84; A. and Others v the UK [GC] (App. no. 3455/05), para. 164.
60. Saadi v The United Kingdom [GC] (App. no. 13229/03), para. 68–74.
61. Plesó v Hungary (App. no. 41242/08), para. 59.
62. Bykov v Russia [GC] (App. no. 4378/02), §§ 78–79.
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among themselves uncoordinated and of varying professional standards.63 In other words, the fragmen-
tation of evidential standards is self-similar.
Let me clarify what exactly I argue for. I am not implying that in the criminal justice/penal system
probation officers should not be making judgments about the individuals’ level of compliance.64 The law
is highly context-sensitive, and discretion is part and parcel of probation work. There is after all a limit,
inherent in legal language, to the granularity of guidance which officials/probation managers can
receive. Treating decisions about unique individuals as if they are indistinguishable from general rules
of conduct does not offer a viable solution to real-life problems, but merely adds to the uncertainty. What
I am saying is that the decision-making process for recalling the released offender’s licence is not, indeed
cannot be nested in the evidential and procedural framework of guarantees salient in the criminal justice
system especially vis-à-vis reliability, prohibition of verballing, and proper assessment of confession
statements. This is particularly problematic from the point of view of the integrity of the criminal justice
system insofar,65 as we can only tolerate the use of deception and psychological manipulation for the
extraction of confessions at the price of using double evidential standards. Making false representations
about the validity of the device, especially about its diagnostic potential in order to instil fear and elicit
semi-voluntary confessions, is deeply alarming not only vertically, i.e. with regard to the lack of validity
of the procedure, but also horizontally, i.e. in view of the operational tensions within the criminal justice
system. As Dixon explains: ‘On a holistic view, integrity implies normative coherence rather than
fragmentation or irreconcilable conflicts in fundamental commitments.’66 Such a commitment is the
requirement to ground decisions on procedurally validated, reliable evidence. It constitutes an irrecon-
cilable contradiction to exclude unreliable evidence from the criminal process when at the same time
these can be used to revoke a released offender’s licence—whether the polygraph evidence is the sole
evidential basis of the decision or not.
The generation and use of disclosures extracted with the use of polygraph exemplifies that funda-
mental values and principles of the criminal process are not integrated throughout the set of practices
within the context of probation, i.e. across the penal system. Whereas e.g. confession evidence can be
ruled (in-)admissible during a voir dire, an adverse statement during the polygraph test may trigger
enforcement proceedings, i.e. may revoke the offender’s licence and send him back to prison without any
of the procedural and evidential guarantees of the interview processes set out in PACE and its codes of
practice: that a person must be cautioned before being questioned about an alleged offence; that they
must be informed of their legal rights; more specifically: that they are entitled to free legal advice; that
they have the right not to incriminate themselves etc.
This disparity catalyses a disintegration process which threatens to break the criminal justice system
to its component parts. For it will be increasingly difficult—especially now that other areas of law
(domestic abuse, counter-terrorism) are queuing up to deploy the polygraph—to preserve one of the
main features of law: its ‘characteristic unity and continuity’ (Hart, 1961: 116). The dissociation of
common standards of validity through probation practice brings about the Noah effect which has become
a shorthand term in modern science for discontinuity and disruption. The criminal justice system cannot
integrate diametrically opposing standards of legal validity. The use of the polygraph proves thus to be
more significant than its restricted use. It turns out to open a disconcerting gap between procedural rights
63. According to the Report of the Chief Inspector of Probation (Stacey, 2019), in 80% of Community Rehabilitation Companies
(CRCs) inspected by HMI Probation the implementation and delivery of probation supervision has been rated as ‘inadequate’.
In the 10 CRCs inspected since January 2018, the implementation and delivery of probation supervision was rated as
‘requiring improvement’ in two, and ‘inadequate’ in the remaining eight.
64. Remember that individuals who have been found in breach of their license conditions may be recalled and return to prison at
the instigation of their Offender Manager ‘if their behaviour indicates an increased risk of serious harm to the public and/or
(for people with determinate sentences) an increased risk of further offending’. HPPS (2019).
65. Term is used in R v C [2014] EWCA Crim 343, at [6] and [9]; R v Clayton [2014] EWCA Crim 1030 at [13].
66. See the collection of articles edited by Hunter et al (2016), especially Dixon (2016: 79).
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and probation rights, between the criminal process and a probation system which appears to be by design
‘irredeemably flawed’ (Stacey, 2019: 20).
Concluding remarks
In what has arguably been the most famous series in chess, the grandmaster Gary Kasparov made in the
second game against ‘Deep Blue’ a highly unusual—for a player of his abilities—error: he forfeited a
position which he probably could have drawn. Experts believe that the reason for Kasparov’s erratic
behaviour in the second game actually lies in the first one where Deep Blue’s notorious 44th move was to
move its rook for no apparent purpose (see Silver, 2012: 288 for more discussion). As it turned out, Deep
Blue had just been unable to ‘select’ a move, so it picked a play totally at random. Kasparov then
assumed that Deep Blue’s counterintuitive play, which in truth was merely the result of a bug, must have
been a sign of superior intelligence. This made Kasparov feel anxious and, ultimately, led to the latter’s
historic defeat.
In this article I tried to show that the same holds true in relation to the use of the polygraph
masquerading as a ‘lie detector’. If anxiety caused a chess grandmaster to behave irrationally, then
we can fathom a guess about the decisional impairment caused by Kafkaesque procedures involving
pseudoscientific devices, psychological manipulation and fraudulent statements on released offenders.
The probation manager whose overarching objective is to rehabilitate offenders and thus reduce
recidivism and protect society, resorts directly or indirectly to fraudulent claims, bogus interview
methods and verballing tactics. In view of the general characteristics of released offenders (lack of
qualifications, relative inability to gauge risks or control emotion), we can speak of interrogative
suggestibility at its very worst. This raises questions about the general character of our punitive and
probation policy. Deploying the polygraph has been known for decades to be about its deterrent effect
(Lee, 1952) rather than its truth-conducive character. However, securing deterrence and compliance,
which are the declared goal of inserting the polygraph in the licence of released offenders, comes at a
heavy price: the dehumanisation of the interviewee. Minimising risks of harm to the public is a valuable
pursuit. But even though the behaviour of the released offender should be monitored, released offenders
need—in liberal societies—the necessary breathing space, guaranteed by human rights legislation (right
not to incriminate oneself, protection against oppression and arbitrariness, dignified treatment of offen-
ders and reliable investigation methods). Liberal orders should be able to accept and absorb micro-
disturbances. Subjecting (vulnerable) individuals to zombie forensics and interview rituals to extract
confession statements means that, as the High Court of England and Wales on a different occasion
observed, we ‘undervalue a cardinal democratic freedom. In this country we have never had a Cheka, a
Gestapo or a Stasi. We have never lived in an Orwellian society.’67
Very often in the history of criminal justice, institutions have exerted psychological or even physical
pressure on the individual to bypass evidential arrangements, extract confession statements and dis-
charge the burden of proof. A confession has always been regarded as the convenient solution, and the
dependence (or perhaps: addiction?) of judicial systems on confessions has, historically, provided the
blueprint for major failures. The use of the polygraph is a low point in the long effort to make sure that
the criminal justice system is tethered to its own promulgated principles including rationalism (see ‘The
law of expert evidence in England and Wales’ section) and individual rights (see under ‘Polygraph and
human rights’).
I suspect that this irrational feature of our criminal justice system is something more than merely a
bug in the system. For what produces aberrations from the point of view of the standard approach to
criminal justice produces consistency from the perspective of a set of ideas which claim to gain
relevance again: actuarial justice. The focus on managerialism and case-management rather than on
67. See also Miller v College [2020] EWHC 225 (Admin) at [257].
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a procedurally validated and truth-conducive assessment of what happened in each case threatens to
exempt probation from the criminal justice system including its network of constitutional, procedural,
and evidential safeguards. This is too high a price for the detection of a released offender violating one of
the imposed licence conditions. This article will, hopefully, help policy-makers and law officials to mark
the boundary between fiction and reality and confine lie-detectors to the world of phantasy where they
belong.
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